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Abstract 
This paper analyses how a set of economic variables and a deterrence variable affect 
criminal activity. Furthermore, it highlights the extent to which crime is detrimental 
for the economic activity. The case study is Italy for the time span 1970 up to 2004. 
An Autoregressive Distributed Lags approach is employed to assess the cointegration 
status of the variables under investigation. A Granger causality test is also 
implemented to establish temporal interrelationships. The main finding is that all 
crime typologies, but homicides and fraud, have a crowding-out effect on legal 
economic activity, reducing the employment rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Criminal activity can impose great costs to the public and private 
actors. Crime activity can lead to both direct and indirect costs for a 
society: the former are derived from the value of lost lives, damaged 
goods, lost wages, reduced trade activity; the second type of costs are for 
example higher insurance premiums, increased levels of security (e.g. 
housing and public building alarm systems, more police forces); these 
costs can have detrimental effects on domestic and foreign direct 
investments, employment and economic growth (Sandler and Enders, 
2005).  
From an economic perspective, a criminal offender can be viewed as a 
rational individual that maximises his/her utility allocating his/her time 
between legal and illegal activities given a budget constraint. In the 
decision making process, a potential offender will compare costs and 
benefits derived from a criminal act. As Becker (1968) points out, a 
rational offender will carry out an illegal activity if the marginal benefit 
deriving from crime, discounted by the expected value of the penalty, is 
higher than the marginal benefit deriving from a legal activity, ceteris 
paribus.  
However, the level of crime in a country does not depend only on 
criminals’ rationality, attitude towards risk and preferences but also on 
several economic, demographic and sociological factors, given that 
individuals tend to respond to incentives. For example, an economic 
expansion could be beneficial to reduce criminality but favourable 
economic conditions can also trigger higher levels of illegal activity; on 
the contrary, economic turmoil can induce more individuals to commit a 
criminal activity such as theft or robbery. Law enforcement can also have 
an important impact on crime. For instance, with longer average time 
served in prison and higher probability of punishment less criminal acts 
might be perpetrated. Sociological and demographic factors such as the 
level of social cohesion, family disruption, immigration, education, gender 
and age might influence criminal activity.  
Entorf and Spengler (2004) notice that economic crime research is still 
limited in Europe. As far as Italy is concerned, an increasing number of 
empirical studies are available in the economic crime literature (e.g. 
Marselli and Vannini, 1997; Buonanno, 2003; Mauro and Carmeci, 2007).  
Italy makes an interesting case study not only because it accounts for 
about 10% of all crime offences in the European Union (Eurostat, 2006), 
but also, and especially, because Italian crime is historically specialized in 
property crimes (such as theft and robbery), where the economic 
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motivations might play a significant role, while violent offences (such as 
homicide and assault) are much less common with respect to other 
European countries. Italy is also an important case study because a 
consistent number of murders is done by organized crime, such as Sicilian 
mafia, Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta, mainly for economics reasons. These 
features might be of interest in designing an economic model of crime, 
testing to what extent socio-economic variables influence crime in Italy, 
both in the short and long run.  
The present empirical study is based on the empirical work proposed by 
Narayan and Smyth (2004) that analyse male youth unemployment and 
real income as determinants of crime rates in Australia. An 
AutoRegressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) cointegration analysis is 
adopted and a Granger causality test highlights temporal relationships 
between the variables under investigation. 
In the current paper, an investigation on the dynamic relationship 
amongst six main crime typologies (i.e. number of recorded thefts, 
homicides; robberies, extortions and kidnapping; fraud; crimes against 
property; and total crime) and a set of socioeconomic determinants in a 
multivariate framework is pursued. The case study is Italy and an annual 
frequency is used from 1970 up to 2004. As a first step of the research a 
general-to-specific methodology is run in order to reach a more 
parsimonious specification based upon information criteria, diagnostic 
tests and statistically significant coefficients. In this manner, it is possible 
to choose parsimoniously those factors that influence crime. Hence, an 
autoregressive distributed lags approach is employed to assess the 
integration and cointegration status of the variables under investigation. 
As discussed later in the paper, rather than using Johansen’s approach, 
this framework allows one to run a more robust testing procedure with a 
small sample size and at the same time it assumes an endogeneity 
condition amongst the variables under investigation unlikely the Engle 
and Granger procedure.  
The main questions are the following: 
- Do socio-economic variables affect crime in Italy?  
- Are there significant differences that emerge when employing different 
economic variables to analyse crime? As Baharom and Habibullah (2008) 
point out (quoting a previous study by Chrisholm and Choe, 2005) “there 
is ambiguity in the empirical studies of crime economics regarding various 
income variables used to proxy the expected net gains from crime and as 
a result empirical findings are often mixed or contradictory to one 
another” (p. 1). Scorcu and Cellini (1998), for example analyse the 
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relationship between economic variables and crime in Italy. Within a 
bivariate framework, they show that homicides and robberies can be 
better explained by consumption, whereas thefts can be better explained 
by unemployment. Hence, in light of this literature ambiguity, one of the 
main contributions of the present study is to give a comprehensive 
empirical investigation of the underlying economic factors, measured by 
three economic variables, namely the per capita real GDP, the real output 
and per capita real income, that are assumed to contribute to the different 
crime patterns. However, only best models outcomes are reported in this 
paper (though full results can be provided upon request). 
-  Is criminal activity detrimental for legal activity? As Sandler and Enders 
(2005) point out, economic upturns and downturns can be thought of as 
consequences as well as root causes of crime. Besides, though the first 
hypothesis has been mostly proven in the literature, the second 
hypothesis has been mainly investigated via a Granger causality analysis. 
Hence, this paper goes a further step forward by employing the economic 
determinants of interest (i.e. income and employment) as dependent 
variables.   
- Are there specific government acts that can influence criminal activity? 
Across the three decades under investigation, several governments 
interventions have occurred, such as amnesties, de-penalisations, pardons 
and structural reforms. The question is whether these law acts have 
affected certain crime typologies.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section a review of 
the most recent studies is provided. In the third section an account on 
data and methodology employed is given. In the fourth section, empirical 
results emerging from the ARDL model, Vector Error Correction 
Mechanism (VECM) and Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) modelling, 
Granger causality testing analyses are reported. Conclusions are provided 
in the last section.  
 
2. A literature review 
This section is aimed at giving an account on the literature related to 
the analysis of the interrelationship between economic variables and 
criminal activity.  
A new field of analysis on criminal activity and economics stems from the 
seminal work by Fleisher (1963), which investigates the effect of 
unemployment on juvenile delinquency. Some years later, Becker (1968) 
sketches the first criminal choice model, where the criminal is 
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hypothesised as a rational agent that maximizes his/her individual utility 
given his/her budget constraint. 
Since then, many scholars have studied which variables affect criminal 
agents’ choices and behaviour: unemployment (Witt et al., 1998; Raphael 
and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Marselli and Vannini, 2000), inequality (Kelly, 
2000; Choe, 2008), business cycles (Pyle and Deadman, 1994), education 
(Freeman, 1994; Lochner, 1999; Usher, 1997), social capital (Buonanno et 
al., 2006), weather (Field, 1992; Jacob et al., 2004), abortion (Donohue III 
and Levitt, 2001), social interaction (Patacchini and Zenou, 2005) and 
many other variables (see Buonanno (2003) for a survey of the literature 
on crime determinants).   
Although the analysis of crime determinants has received wide attention 
in economic literature, the role of criminal activity as an explanatory 
variable is still much neglected. To this respect, crime can be viewed as a 
relevant activity that might have an impact on economic performance and 
economic agents’ decisions, but to date there are still very few works that 
have as main objective the investigation of the effects generate by crime 
on economic activity. 
The first contribution in this field is given by the use of the “rule-of-law” 
variable, proposed by Knack and Keefer (1995), in a number of growth 
model regressions (Barro, 1996; Sala-i-Martin, 1997).  
Mauro (1995) finds a significant negative relation between “subjective 
corruption indexes” and the growth rate among 70 countries in the early 
1980s. Del Monte and Pagani (2001), by implementing several dynamic 
panel data approaches to the Italian Regions, show two distinct negative 
corruption effects: the first one on private investment and the second one 
on the efficiency of public expenditures on infrastructure.  
Pshisva and Suarez (2006) identify the negative impact of ransom 
kidnappings on investment in Colombia. Daniele and Marani (2008) 
analyse the effect of crime on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Italy 
using province data. They found that extortions and the presence of 
organized crime reduce FDI flows. De Mello and Zilberman (2008), using 
local Brazilian data, assess how property crime induces more savings. 
Following Barro literature, Forni and Paba (2000) examine the impact of a 
number of socio-economical variables on the economic performance of 
the Italian provinces during the period 1971-1991. They consider growth 
not only in terms of income, but also in terms of employment and 
population. Their results indicate that murders, used as an index of 
organized crime activity, strongly affect employment growth. Based on 
Forni and Paba results, Peri (2004) considers a larger Italian provinces 
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dataset (1951 - 1991). He shows that the annual per capita growth and the 
annual employment growth are negatively affected by murders after 
controlling for other explanatory variables. 
Recently, Cardenas (2007) analyzes Colombia’s annual GDP growth 
between 1951 and 2005. He identifies the causes of the prolonged 
deceleration in growth observed in the country during the past two 
decades. Using the standard sources-of-growth-decomposition, he 
indicates that the deceleration of economic growth is the result of a 
reduction of productivity. The results of a VAR approach and the 
Granger causality tests suggest the presence of a causal relation from drug 
trafficking to violent crime, and from violet crime to productivity. Finally, 
the author focuses on the relationship between crime and growth rate in 
an unbalanced panel of 65 countries between 1971 and 1999. The results 
indicate that a one percent increase in criminality, namely homicide, leads 
to 0.003% reduction in growth rate of GDP per capita by decade. 
In a recent paper, Burdett et al. (2006) present a theoretical model in 
which crime and economic variables, namely unemployment and 
inequality, are endogenous. This approach allows one to highlight the 
interactions amongst the variables and to consider some general 
equilibrium properties. More specifically, the model describes the link 
between crime and unemployment in both directions that imply the 
possibility to have multiple equilibria.  
Mauro and Carmeci (2007) empirically explore the link between crime, 
unemployment and economic growth using Italian regional data. The 
results of the ARDL model, within a panel data framework, suggest that 
crime has a negative long-run effect on output level rather than on output 
growth. 
Masih and Masih (1996) estimate the relationship between different crime 
types and their socioeconomic determinants within a multivariate 
cointegrated system for the Australian case. Within a Granger test 
framework, the authors establish the direction of the temporal causation 
between the variables, but they fail to find a crime impact on the 
socioeconomic variables under study. 
Narayan and Smyth (2004) implement the Granger causality to examine 
the relationship between seven different crime categories, unemployment 
and real wage in Australia within an ARDL model. They found that in the 
short run robbery and stealing Granger cause real income while robbery 
and motor vehicle theft Granger cause unemployment. In the long run, 
income is Granger caused by unemployment, homicide and motor 
 7
vehicle, whereas fraud is Granger caused by real income and 
unemployment. 
Habibullah and Baharon (2008), applying an ARDL model to the 
Malaysian case, analyse the relationship between real gross national 
product and different crime offences. The results indicate that the long 
run causal effect in all cases runs from economic performance to crime 
rates and not viceversa. In a further paper, Habibullah and Baharon 
(2008) employ an ARDL model to test the Granger causality between 
income inequality and several crime offences in Malaysia. The authors fail 
to find any effect, either in the long-run or in the short-run, in either 
direction (that is from crime to income inequality and viceversa). 
 
3. Data and methodology 
In this paper six crime typologies are employed: number of recorded 
thefts (RB), number of recorded attempted or committed intentional 
homicides (H), number of recorded robberies, extortions and kidnapping 
(SAK), number of recorded fraud (F), number of recorded crimes against 
property (TCP) and finally total number of recorded crimes (TC); all these 
variables are defined per 100 thousands inhabitants. A preliminary 
investigation has involved a general-to-specific modelling approach in 
order to choose a set of economic (e.g. per capita gross domestic product, 
per capita real output, per capita real income; employment; national 
consumption), demographic (e.g. quota of women, age ranges), 
sociological (e.g. education, divorces) and deterrence variables (e.g. 
unknown offenders, average length of time served in prison by crime 
typology) based upon their statistical significance as well as on a priori 
interpretation belief. Following such a more rigorous procedure, the key 
determinants of each crime typology can be identified (Hendry, 1995). All 
the variables under study have been transformed in a natural logarithmic 
specification (L), assuming the existence of a non-linear relationship. An 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach can then be employed. The 
functions under investigation are the following: 
1) LRB = f (LURB, LY, EMP)      
2) LH = f (LUH, LPR, LEM)         
3) LSAK = f(LUSAK, LPR, LEM)           
4) LF = f(LUF, LY, LEM)                    
5) LTCP = f(LUTCP, LPR, LEM)        
6) LTC = f (LTC, LPR, LEM)                
where, LRB, LH, LSAK, LF, LTCP and LTC are the previously defined 
crime variables.  LURB, LUH, LUSAK, LUF, LUTCP and LUTC are the 
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ratio between the number of recorded crimes committed by unknown 
offenders and all recorded crimes in a given category (LUNK, as in Tables 
3, 4 and 5); these variables are a proxy of the deterrence effect stemming 
from the criminal investigation efficiency of the local police force and 
from their knowledge of the local underworld (Marselli and Vannini, 
1997); the expected sign of their coefficient is positive. LY and LPR are 
the per capita real income and output respectively; the expected sign is 
either positive, if an economic expansion causes an increase in crime (the 
wealthier a society the higher the crime level), or negative if an economic 
expansion causes a decrease in crime (the wealthier a society the lower the 
crime level). A crime crowding-out effect on legal economic activity is 
also tested and the expected sign for the coefficient of the crime variable 
is negative, that is, crime levels are higher the lower the economic growth 
employed as the dependent variable. Finally, LEM is the quota of 
employed active population; the expected sign is either positive or 
negative. In general, we expect a higher level of employment to lead to a 
crime reduction; however, it could be also true that in areas with higher 
levels of employed people a higher number of crimes is committed. In the 
case of Italy, Marselli and Vannini (2000) show that an increase in the 
unemployment rate drives more homicides, thefts and robberies. As a 
novel implementation, the impact of crime on employment rate is also 
tested and the expected effect is negative, that is, illegal and legal activities 
are presumed to be substitutes.  
All data used in this paper are obtained from Istituto Nazionale di Statistica 
(ISTAT).  
Data are aggregated at the Italian national level, using  annual frequency 
from 1970 up to 2004.. An AutoRegressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) 
model is commonly employed in a time series analysis when the number 
of observations available are relatively small. One of the problems with 
employing a relatively low number of observations (in this case 33 data 
points) is to establish the order of integration of the variables under 
investigation. However, Pesaran et al. (2001) propose a method to test for 
cointegration irrespective of whether the variables under investigation are 
stationary in the level, I(0), or stationary in their first difference, I(1).  By 
applying the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron (PP) 
test, all variables are I(0) but LH, LTCP, LEM and LUF, which are found 
to be stationary in the first difference (Table 1). The second phase of the 
analysis involves testing for a long run relationship amongst the variables 
reported in functions (1) – (6). To this aim, an ARDL representation is 
followed (see Pesaran et al., 2001 for a greater detail)  
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4. Empirical results 
As a first step of the analysis, the cointegration test outcome is given. 
As a further step results on either a VECM or a VAR specification are 
specified. Finally, a Granger causality analysis is run to investigate the 
temporal relationships amongst the variables of interest.  
 
4.1 Cointegration and empirical results 
The cointegration test results are provided in Table 2. For all the 
empirical models, where the crime variables are employed on the left side 
of the equation, no cointegrating relationship is found. The next step of 
the investigation consists in running a VAR where the variables are 
treated as either I(0) or I(1), according to the ADF and PP unit roots test. 
Table 3 provides the main empirical findings derived from the static 
solution (the dynamic results can be provided upon request).   
For the first model (LRB) an ARDL(1,3,2,3) is estimated based upon the 
AIC criterion; the diagnostics show an overall goodness of fit with no 
problems in the residuals, with the only exception for some 
heteroschedasticity detected at 5% (this outcome is not uncommon in 
ARDL models, see for example Pesaran et al. 2001). In this case, all 
variables of interest are statistically significant. Specifically, an increase in 
lack of deterrence by 1% causes an increase in thefts by more than 17%. 
On the one hand, a positive change in employment growth by 1% 
negatively effects this typology of crime, with a decrease of approximately 
13%. On the other hand, an increase in the per capita real income causes 
a decrease in thefts of almost 3%. Hence, these findings support the idea 
that economic growth can help reducing thefts in Italy. 
An interesting finding relates to the effects of crime on legal activity 
(Table 5). An increase in thefts by 1% determines a decrease in 
employment growth by 0.04%. This result is in line with the belief that 
being arrested reduces the probability to be employed (Narayan and 
Smyth, 2004). Besides, this outcome is also congruent with Becker’s 
economic model where rational agents trade off between legal and illegal 
activity, leading to a substitution between working time and crime.  
Model 2 relates to the number of homicides per 100 thousands 
inhabitants (LH). Following the unit roots test, LH and LEM are treated 
as I(1), whereas LUH and LPR are included in the level (being I(0)). A 
VAR is run accordingly and Table 3 shows the static solution results; the 
residuals show a good fit. The only statistically significant outcome is that 
an increase in employment growth by 1% causes a 2.7% increase in 
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homicides growth. This outcome is in line with the belief that areas 
characterized by a higher level of employment might experience higher 
levels of violent crimes.  
However, evidence is provided that this type of crime is detrimental for 
economic activity. When treating LPR as the dependent variable (Table 
4), a growth in homicides by 1% causes a decrease in real production by 
0.06%; hence a crime crowding-out effect is supported. Nevertheless, as 
reported in Table 5, DLH positive effects the employment growth 
(DLEM).  
Turning to the number of recorded robberies, extortions and kidnapping 
(LSAK) as a function of the deterrence variable (LUSAK), per capita real 
output (LPR) and employment change (DLEM), Table 3 shows the static 
solution results. Notably, a lack of deterrence enhances this type of crime: 
if LUSAK increases by 1% LSAK raises by 3.5% on an annual basis. LPR 
is the only economic variable statistically significant; an increase in per 
capital real output by 1% determines an increase of LSAK by 1.3%.  
From Table 5, a negative relationship emerges between LSAK and 
DLEM when using the latter as the dependent variable. Overall, an 
increase by 1% in this type of crime determines a decrease in employment 
growth by 0.05%. This outcome is in line with the previous finding for 
LRB. 
In Model 4 the fraud variable (LF) is employed as the dependent variable. 
The preliminary findings showed as the per capita real income (LY) is the 
appropriate determinant. The residuals are a white noise and normally 
distributed; however, some signs of heteroschedasticity are present at the 
5% level. From the static solution findings, a negative relationship is 
detected for LY showing that an increase in national wealth by 1% 
reduces this crime typology by 2.4% (Table 3). LF positively effects the 
employment growth (DLEM) (Table 5). This outcome is consistent with 
the belief that fraud is also committed by employees, as this type of 
criminal act is often hidden under legal activities.  
In Model 5 LTCP (number of recorded crime against the property) is 
employed as the dependent variable in its level. From the unit roots test a 
mixed evidence emerges on the integration status of this variable (see 
Table 1). Nevertheless, a preliminary investigation has shown that treating 
LTCP as I(0) outperforms the model that includes LTCP as I(1), and 
detects no problems in the residuals. Table 3 highlights an expected 
positive relationship between the lack of deterrence (LUTCP) and this 
crime typology: the coefficient denotes an increase by 7.3% ceteris paribus. 
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In addition, an increase in per capita real output by 1% leads to a decrease 
in the number of crimes against property by 2.8% per year.   
Tables 4 and 5 report the dynamics between LTCP and DLEM. Once 
more, a negative relationship is detected between these two variables; 
specifically, a rise in crime against property by 1% reduces the real output 
by 0.7% and the employment rate by 0.04%. 
As a final step of the investigation, total number of recorded crimes 
(LTC) are taken into consideration (Model 6). Best results are achieved 
when employing LUTC, LPR and DLEM as explanatory variables. 
Hence, a VAR is run following the ADF and PP outcomes (Table 1), and 
no problems are detected in the residuals. The static solution is reported 
in Table 3. The LUTC coefficient has the expected positive sign, hence an 
increase by 1% of the quota of recorded crimes committed by unknown 
offenders causes a rise in overall crime by the same magnitude. Besides, 
an increase by 1% of the national output leads to an increase in total 
crime by 0.4%. 
As a further result, the coefficient of the first lag of the cointegrating 
vector depicts the expected negative sign (Table 4). The negative 
relationship between crime and employment rate is also confirmed. A rise 
in total crime by 1% causes a decrease in the employment growth by 
0.05% ceteris paribus (Table 5).  
As a matter of fact, Table 3 shows the existence of specific effects that 
require the inclusion of dummy variables (i.e. D91 takes the value one in 
the year 1991 and zero otherwise; D98 takes the value one in the year 
1998 and zero otherwise; D00 takes the value of one in the year 2000 and 
zero otherwise). The first qualitative variable (D91), that effects thefts 
(LRB) and homicides (DLH), is possibly picking up the positive effect 
produced by the introduction of the new criminal procedure, that has 
improved the efficiency of the procedure iter and indirectly the speed in 
the data collection (ISTAT, 1994). Furthermore, as the Ministero degli 
Interni (Home Office, 2007) points out, the mafia homicides escalation 
occurred between 1988-1992, with the highest peak in 1991, was 
contrasted by the State in the following decade, greatly reducing this type 
of crime. D98 is included in Model 3 and it is detecting the escalation in 
bank robberies that occurred in Italy. Finally, D00 in Model 2 has a 
negative sign; according to ISTAT (2002) in 2000 a general decrease in 
certain type of crimes such as homicides is detected as well as a rise in 




4.2. The no-Granger Causality null hypothesis 
Given two events A and B it is possible to establish whether A 
precedes B, or B precedes A, or indeed the two events are 
contemporaneous (Granger, 1988). A standard multivariate Granger 
causality test is run either augmented with the error-correction term 
(ECT) as derived from the cointegration relationship, or as a VAR when 
no cointegrating relationship exists amongst the variables. The main 
findings are provided in Table 6.  
The hypothesis that unemployment drives crime is only supported for the 
thefts case (LRB). However, the hypothesis that crime leads to 
unemployment holds for all crime typologies with the only exception for 
LSAK (robberies, extortions and kidnapping). In the thefts and overall 
crime models (1 – 6, Table 6) a unidirectional Granger causality runs from 
either income or output to crime.  
Interestingly, the lack of deterrence drives crime against property and 
overall crime.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed crime in Italy for the time span between 1970 
up to 2004. The quantitative approach has involved a pre-modelling 
analysis. To this aim a cointegration and ARDL estimation analysis has 
been run. A full range of diagnostic statistics has been provided.  
This paper has given some answers consistent with the existing literature.  
Do socio-economic variables affect crime in Italy? Via a preliminary 
general-to-specific investigation, it has been possible to parsimoniously 
reduce the model to a congruent specification. The empirical evidence has 
shown that socio-demographic variables do not have particular effects on 
crime activity at a national level. Nevertheless, economic and deterrence 
variables appear to play a relevant role in explaining crime evolution and 
patterns. Specifically, the lack of deterrence positively influence the 
number of thefts, robberies, extortions, & kidnapping, crime against 
property and total crime.   
- Do significant differences emerge when employing different economic 
variables to analyse crime? In this paper, evidence has been provided that 
theft and fraud are better explained by per capita real income, while all the 
other types of crime under investigation are better explained by per capita 
real production. Hence, in line with the findings of Scorcu and Cellini 
(1998), particular care should be used in assessing which economic 
variables best fit crime models.  
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- Is criminal activity detrimental for legal activity? In this paper evidence 
has been provided that economic upturns (downturns) can be thought 
both as a consequence of crime as well as root causes of crime. On the 
one hand, homicides and crime against property leads to a crowding out 
effect on real per capita output. On the other hand, all crime typologies 
(but homicides and fraud) cause a reduction in the employment growth. 
This outcome is consistent with the trade off between illegal and legal 
activity from a rational agent perspective. 
- Are there specific government acts that influence criminal activity? 
Given the initial non-normality problems in the residuals, it seems clear 
that criminal procedure reforms have had an impact on recorded crimes. 
Specifically, the strongest impact occurred in 1991, one year after the new 
criminal procedure was introduced. Evidence is given that the gained 
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Table 1 Unit roots test on dependent and explanatory variables (sample: 1970- 2004) 
Variable 
Determinants -  
Status 
ADF lags PP lags 
LRB c  - I(0) -4.995608 *** 0 -5.039413 *** 3 
LH c,t - I(1) -2.947470 4 -2.858288 4 
∆LH c,t - I(0) -3.636170** 4 -8.224444*** 11 
LSAK c,t - I(0) -3.557578* 7 -7.670712*** 32 
LF c,t - I(0) -3.694905** 2 -2.821937 8 
LTCP c,t - I(1) or I(0) -3.133971 8 -4.025393** 3 
∆LTCP c,t  - I(0) -4.107483** 1 -5.744139*** 2 
LTC c,t I(0) -3.886417** 0 
-3.908443** 
2 
LEM c,t -  I(1) -2.706870 0 -2.402357 7 
∆LEM c,t - I(0) -7.889586*** 0 -8.530295*** 7 
LPR c,t I(0)  -4.741978*** 8 -6.107679
*** 
4 
LURB c I(0) -5.359157*** 0 -5.540653*** 2 
LUH c I(0) -3.122547** 1 -3.075952** 5 
LUSAK c,t I(0) -4.070931** 7 -6.754899*** 4 
LUF c I(1) -1.197526 0 -1.197526 0 
∆LUF c,t I(0) -4.878565*** 0 -4.842171*** 3 
LUTCP c I(0) -4.686414*** 0 -4.697139*** 3 
LUTC c I(0) -3.673384*** 0 -3.576253** 3 
Notes: (1) MacKinnon’s critical values for rejection of null hypothesis of a unit root. (2) *** and ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. (3) ∆ denotes the first-difference operator. (4) Number of lags set to 
the first statistically significant lag, testing downwards; number of lags in the ADF test is set upon AIC criterion and PP 
test upon Newey-West bandwidth. (5) A constant and trend  (c,t) are included upon a trend coefficient statistically 










Table 2 Testing Cointegration: an ARDL framework  
Notes: *, **, ***, statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; when * the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration holds, as only 33 observations are employed (see Narayan and Smyth, 2004,2006); ٧ = inconclusive inference; 
k= number of regressors included into the equation; p = number of lags; Case II and III with restricted and no restricted 
constant, respectively; Case IV and V with restricted trend and unrestricted constant, and unrestricted trend and unrestricted 




Equation k p F-statistics t-statistics 
Model (1)   Case II Case III Case IV Case V Case III Case v 
LRB=f(LURB, LY, LEM)  3 1 1.84 2.24 - - -2.78٧ - 
LURB=f(LRB, LY, LEM) 3 2 - - 4.22* 4.82* - -4.11* 
ECTLURBLY = LURB -.0093909*LRB  -.082819*LY +  .088067*LEM +   .92165*C + .008576*TREND 
                  (-1.54)       (-5.01)***    (1.44)      (5.76)*** (2.90)** 
LY=f(LRB, LURB, LEMP)  3 3 1.20 1.08 - - -0.77 - 
LEM=f(LRB, LURB, LY) 3 1 3.29* 3.94* - - -3.03٧ - 
Model (2)         
LH=f(LUH, LPR, LEM) 3 2 1.05 1.16 - - -1.54 - 
LUH=f(LH, LPR, LEM) 3 1 3.35* 3.48 ٧ - - -3.61* - 
LPR=f(LH, LUH, LEM) 3 2 - - 2.17 1.88 - -2.41 
LEM=f(LH, LUH, LPR) 3 1 1.78 2.14 - - -1.59 - 
Model (3)         
LSAK=f(LUSAK, LPR, LEM) 3 1 2.92 2.72 - - -2.45 - 
LUSAK=f(LSAK, LPR, LEM) 3 1 3.81** 2.15 - - -1.12 - 
ECTLUSAK = LUSAK -0.28174*LSAK +0.46805*LPR -0.30609*LEM -5.5166*C  
                  (-5.15)***     (2.53)**      (-O.33)     (-1.73)*     
LPR=f(LSAK, LUSAK, LEM) 3 3 0.88 0.58 - - - -0.07 
LEM=f(LSAK, LUSAK, LPR) 3 3 2.82٧ 2.03 - - 0.14 - 
Model (4)         
LF=f(LUF, LY, LEM) 3 1 - - 2.03 2.29 - -2.81 
LUF=f(LF, LY, LEM) 3 3 2.77٧ 3.45٧ - - -0.08 - 
LY=f(LF, LUF, LEM) 3 2 1.68 1.82 - - -2.22 - 
LEM=f(LF, LUF, LY) 3 1 - - 3.77* 2.78 - -3.26٧ 
Model (5)         
LTCP=f(LUTCP, LPR, LEM) 3 2 3.27* 3.77٧ - - -3.45٧ - 
LUTCP=f(LTCP, LPR, LEM) 3 1 - - 4.27** 5.33** - -4.20** 
ECTLUTCP= LUTCP  -.059270*LTCP +  .034754*LPR  -.052176*LEM + 0.001683*TREND 
                  (-2.68)**     (2.08)**      (-1.95)*    (-8.51)*** 
LPR=f(LTCP, LUTCP, LEM) 3 3 1.43 1.11 - - -0.33 - 
LEM=f(LTCP, LUTCP, LPR) 3 2 1.16 1.87 - - -1.60 - 
Model (6)         
LTC=f(LUTC, LPR, LEM) 
3 2 2.24 2.33 - - -3.23 - 
LUTC=f(LTC, LPR, LEM) 3 2 1.08 1.32 - - -1.88 - 
LPR=f(LTC, LUTC, LEM) 3 1 - - 8.20*** 3.72٧ - -3.41٧ 
ECTLPRLTC = LPR   -1.0523*LTC +   1.5680*LUTC +   5.1752*LEM  -.025136*TREND 
                  (-2.65)**     (2.40)**      (1.56)    (1.64) 
LEM=f(LTC, LUTC, LPR) 3 1 3.20٧ 2.03 - - -2.18 - 
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C 32.29 (4.35***) -0.62 (-0.91) 0.33 (2.46**) 23.89 (2.28**) 46.65 (4.61***) 2.49 (2.60**) 
LUNK 17.35 (2.27**) 0.006 (0.21) 3.55 (11.85***) -0.28 (-1.33) 7.31 (5.84***) 1.03 (4.63***) 
LY -2.78 (-3.33***) - - -2.43 (-2.01*) - - 
LPR - 0.04 (0.94) 1.35 (5.73***) - -2.79 (-3.80***) 0.43 (6.61***) 
DLEM -13.04 (-2.27**) 2.69 (4.24***) 0.53 (0.19) -0.78 (-0.12) 2.66 (1.65) -2.15 (-1.63) 
Trend 0.05 (4.08***) - - 0.10 (5.26***) 0.09 (4.55***) - 
D91 0.81 (3.76***) 0.16 (4.96***) - - - - 
D98 - - 0.33 (2.46**) - - - 
D00 - -0.15 (-4.14***) - - - - 
R2  0.908 0.879 0.994 0.873 0.843 0.834 
AR F(1,15)=0.586 F(1,18)=0.110 F(1,19)=0.308 F(1,22)=0.323 F(1,24)=0.812 F(1,25)=0.367 
FF F(1,15)=1.80 F(1,18)=0.103 F(1,19)=0.694 F(1,22)=1.184 F(1,24)=2.800 F(1,25)=1.146 
Norm χ2=1.14 χ2=0.271 χ2=0.853 χ2=0.820 χ2=0.284 χ2=0.315 
Heter F(1,29)=4.63** F(1,29)=0.689 F(1,29)=0.327 F(1,29)=7.73** F(1,29)=0.002 F(1,29)=0.506 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. (2) D denotes the 
first-difference operator. (3) ARDL set upon AIC criterion. (4) Models run in MFit 4.0 (1997). (5) AR = serial 
correlation; FF= functional form; Norm = normality; Heter = heteroschedasticity.; tests from the dynamic 
specification. (6) ° coefficients of the first statistically significant lag.  
 
 















C 0.71 (3.31***) 9.77 (4.82***) 7.55 (2.77**) 0.66 (2.60**) 7.12 (3.28***) 0.01 (1.68) 
LCRIME° -0.02 (-0.82)   -0.06 (-1.92*) 0.04 (1.23) 0.003 (0.39) -0.07 (-2.48**) 0.03 (1.17) 
LUNK° 0.28 (0.84) -0.06 (-2.29**) 0.12 (1.70) 0.02 (1.36) 0.47 (1.84*) 0.01 (0.20) 
DLEM° 1.05 (4.15***) 1.55 (5.07***) -0.40 (-1.16) 1.03 (4.04***) -0.74 (-2.17**) -0.68 (-1.99*) 
Trend - 0.02 (4.34***) 0.01 (2.43**) - 0.01 (3.19***) - 
ECT - - - - - -0.06 (-2.90***) 
D75 - - - - - -0.05 (-3.16***) 
R2  0.991 0.998 0.998 0.991 0.997 0.682 
AR F(1,25)=0.015 F(1,20)=0.445 F(1,18)=0.330 F(1,25)=0.064 F(1,23)=0.070 F(1,25)=0.043 
FF F(1,25)=0.451 F(1,20)=4.944** F(1,18)=2.031 F(1,25)=0.040 F(1,23)=6.44** F(1,25)=3.573* 
Norm χ2=3.09 χ2=0.496 χ2=1.258 χ2=3.929 χ2=0.261 χ2=0.372 
Heter F(1,29)=0.31 F(1,29)=3.309* F(1,29)=0.475 F(1,29)=0.237 F(1,29)=1.507 F(1,31)=4.57** 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. (2) D denotes the 
first-difference operator. (3) ARDL set upon AIC criterion. (4) Models run in MFit 4.0 (1997). (5) AR = serial 
correlation; FF= functional form; Norm = normality; Heter = heteroschedasticity.; tests from the dynamic 


























C 1.17 (2.63**) -4.70 (-5.59***) -4.38 (-4-45**) -0.04 (-0.29) -0.10 (-1.17) 0.03 (0.36) 
LCRIME° -0.04 (-4.11***)   0.04 (3.15***) -0.05 (-3.13***) 0.01 (2.91**) -0.04 (-3.17***) -0.05 (-3.77***) 
LUNK° 0.71 (4.22***) 0.02 (1.86*) 0.09 (1.90*) -0.01  (-1.88*) 0.09 (0.89) 0.05 (2.93***) 
LPR - LY° -0.34 (3.86***) 0.34 (5.56***) 0.32 (4.26***) -0.13(1.89*) 0.28 (4.24***) -0.14 (-1.89*) 
Trend 0.002 (2.89**) -0.01 (-5.16***) -0.01 (-2.45**) - - - 
R2  0.913 0.756 0.777 0.853 0.769 0.840 
AR F(1,13)=0.050 F(1,21)=0.864 F(1,18)=0.189 F(1,15)=3.000 F(1,19)=0.520 F(1,19)=0.060 
FF F(1,13)=1.933 F(1,21)=0.725 F(1,18)=0.787 F(1,15)=3.032 F(1,19)=2.360 F(1,19)=0.600 
Norm χ2=0.410 χ2=0.867 χ2=0.029 χ2=1.067 χ2=0.764 χ2=0.752 
Heter F(1,29)=0.335 F(1,29)=0.026 F(1,29)=0.661 F(1,29)=1.339 F(1,29)=1.679 F(1,29)=0.094 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. (2) D denotes the 
first-difference operator. (3) ARDL set upon AIC criterion. (4) Models run in MFit 4.0 (1997). (5) AR = serial 
correlation; FF= functional form; Norm = normality; Heter = heteroschedasticity.; tests from the dynamic 






































Table 6  Temporal Granger Causality 
Endogenous variables F-test t-test 
Model 1 LRB LURB LY DLEM ECT(-1) 
LRB - 2.41 10.89***     7.38** - 
LURB 2.12 - 1.60 2.52           -1.29 
LY 0.27 0.23 - 1.22 - 
DLEM 4.63** 1.72 2.77* - - 
Model 2 DLH LUH LPR DLEM ECT(-1) 
DLH - 0.35 0.31 0.31 - 
LUH 2.26 - 7.56* 7.56** - 
LPR 0.67 0.76 - 0.56 - 
DLEM 2.71* 0.20 0.62 - - 
Model 3 LSAK LUSAK LPR DLEM  ECT(-1) 
LSAK - 2.01 1.75 0.12 - 
LUSAK 1.00 - 0.57 0.17  -0.38 
LPR 0.24 1.14 - 0.48 - 
DLEM 1.19 1.02 0.54 - - 
Model 4 LF DLUF LY DLEM ECT(-1) 
LF - 0.27 1.66 0.27  - 
DLUF 0.26 - 0.73 0.72 - 
LY 0.24 0.74 - 0.48 - 
DLEM 4.38** 1.76 1.66 - - 
Model 6 LTCP LUTCP LPR DLEM ECT(-1) 
LTCP - 2.92* 1.68 0.84 - 
LUTCP 0.61 - 0.91 2.74  -1.08 
LPR 1.94 4.12** - 2.51* - 
DLEM 3.16** 2.08 0.44 - - 
Model 5 LTC LUTC LPR DLEM  ECT(-1) 
LTC - 2.86* 2.44* 0.86 - 
LUTC 0.60 - 0.25 0.28 - 
LPR 0.16 0.70 - 0.32  -2.83*** 
DLEM 5.19*** 1.21 0.90 - - 
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